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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I N T H E M A T T E R OF T H E 
E S T A T E A N D G U A R D I A N -
S H I P OF J O A N O E L E R I C H , 
Incompetent. 
H E L E N D. OELERICH, I
 C a s e N o 
Petitioner and Appellant, ) 10005 
vs. 
J O A N O E L E R I C H , Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
The facts, as presented by the appellant, although 
seemingly true, do not clearly portray what the record 
shows with respect to the issues involved in this matter. 
Moreover, the appellant's Statement of Facts indeed 
goes far beyond what is necessary for this appeal. What 
is contemplated by Rule 74 (p) (2), U.R.C.P. is a con-
cise statement of the facts of the case which are relevant 
to the errors asserted for reversal and appellant has 
3 
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recited facts which have nothing to do with the appeal. 
By way of illustration, on pages 4, 5 and 6 of Appel-
lant's Brief, there is a history of the respondent from 
the time she was born until the time the petition for 
appointment of guardian in this matter was filed. In 
addition, on pages 9 and 10, quotations from an affidavit 
by one Virginia Kelly can be found hinting of emotional 
instability. As clearly pointed out by appellant, page 
10 of her brief, there was no hearing on the merits 
of the petition for letters of guardianship. Therefore, 
there is no reason for including the above mentioned 
statements relating to respondent's alleged incompe-
tency. What is important are the facts surrounding 
the dismissal of this petition by the court below and so 
we move on to consider them. 
The procedural steps as outlined by the appellant 
were followed as stated. There are, however, significant 
omissions which must be supplied to present the matter 
fairly. In that connection we mention that settlement 
negotiations between the parties involved and their at-
torneys occurred between December 21, 1961, and April 
17, 1962, the day the respondent testified. (R. 157-158). 
A trust agreement (R. 43-48) was executed on March 
13, 1962, by the respondent in an effort to settle this 
case. (R. 152). However, the appellant stated there 
would be no settlement. (R. 154 and 158). Yet on April 
17, 1962, which was the last hearing before the hearing 
on July 29, 1963, counsel for both the appellant and 
the respondent represented in open court "that they 
were in the process of working out this trust agreement 
4 
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and that if the trust agreement was worked out satis-
factorily, . . . that this proceeding could be deemed 
dismissed." (R. 139). On May 8, 1962, in Chicago, 
Illinois, the respondent and the appellant as the Con-
servator to Collect the Estate of respondent, signed a 
Trust Agreement with the First National Bank of 
Chicago. (R. 76-83). 
On June 28, 1963, counsel for respondent filed a 
motion to dismiss the petition (R. 74) on two grounds 
and one of these was "that a trust agreement had been 
executed by Joan Oelerich, the petitioner, and the First 
National Bank of Chicago." An order of dismissal was 
signed by the court on August 12, 1963, after a hearing 
on July 29, 1963. (R. 91). 
Counsel for petitioner moved to vacate the order 
of dismissal on August 20, 1963. (R. 94). A hearing 
was held on August 26, 1963 to argue this motion. 
(R. 134-148). On September 11, 1963, the court issued 
a Further Memorandum Decision (R. 127) in which 
it denied the petitioner's motion for a rehearing and 
reaffirmed the grounds for dismissal. 
P O I N T L 
T H E COURT D I D NOT E R R I N DISMISS-
I N G T H E P E T I T I O N ON T H E GROUND 
T H A T A T R U S T A G R E E M E N T W A S E N -
T E R E D INTO. 
5 
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A. The court did not err in dismissing the petition 
on the ground that the parties, through counsel, in open 
court agreed to a dismissal if the trust agreement was 
entered into by the parties and a bank. 
On April 17, 1962, counsel for both parties to this 
action represented in open court that this petition would 
be dismissed if a trust agreement was consummated. 
The trust agreement was signed on May 8, 1962, in 
Chicago. No action was taken to dismiss the case until 
June 28, 1963, when the respondent moved for dis-
missal. The court granted a dismissal on the basis that 
the parties, through their counsel, had consummated an 
agreement for dismissal. 
I t is well settled that parties of record to a suit 
who are under no dsability and are suing or defending 
for themselves alone may agree at any time to the dis-
missal of the action or defense, with or without preju-
dice, because they have the absolute control of the liti-
gation at every stage of the proceeding, from its 
inception to, and after, the final judgment. 17 Am. Jur. 
103. 
Since the terms of the agreement for dismissal 
were presented by counsel for the respective parties, the 
crucial question becomes did counsel for the petitioner 
have the authority to dismiss or to settle the case? 
An attorney of record is generally held to have 
implied authority to enter or take a dismissal, discon-
tinuance, or nonsuit that does not bar the bringing of 
6 
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another suit on the same cause of action. These proce-
dural steps have been described as a dismissal or other 
termination without prejudice. 7 Am Ju r 2d 126. The 
order issued in this case does not state whether the 
dismissal is with or without prejudice. (R. 91). There-
there, it would seem to be a dismissal without prejudice. 
Rule 41(a) (1) U.R.C.P. See also 56 A L R 2d 1290. 
In the case of Gagnon Company v. Nevada Desert 
Inn, 45 Cal. 2d 448, 289 P . 2d 466, the California 
Supreme Court held that an attorney had authority to 
commence an action and to dismiss it with prejudice. 
The discussion of that phase of the case at pages 474 
and 475 includes concepts supporting respondent's 
contention. There the court stated: 
"With reference to an attorney's authority to 
dismiss his client's action with prejudice it is said: 
'An important problem is related to the distinc-
tion between voluntary dismissals or nonsuits 
which are without prejudice to the cause of action, 
and dismissals or nonsuits with prejudice, the last 
mentioned type being referred to in the cases by 
the common-law term 'retraxit.' It is clearly 
within the attorney's authority to dismiss the 
client's action without prejudice. (Emphasis 
added). However, a series of early cases held the 
general authority of an attorney even sufficient 
to empower him to effect a retraxit, amounting 
to a renunciation of the client's substantive right 
or cause of action. I t is hardly possible to recon-
cile this rule with the established principle that 
the implied general authority of an attorney does 
not include any power or authority to dispose of 
the client's substantive rights, and it would there-
7 
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fore seem doubtful whether, or to what extent, 
the early cases would now be followed.' (6 Cal. 
Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law § 164.) And further 
in that connection: ' In civil litigation, the attor-
ney, as the client's agent, and in the absence of 
fraud, has authority to bind his client in all mat-
ters pertaining to the regular conduct of a case. 
* * * In the absence of such special instructions, 
the conduct and management of the action is 
entrusted to the attorney's judgment; he decides 
what should be contested, what points should 
be taken, and what should be abandoned. This 
authority is, however, subject to the qualifica-
tion that an authority ordinarily does not have 
implied authority to do an act which will effect 
the surrender or loss of a client's substantial 
rights, for the client determines 'the objectives 
to be attended.' . . . There is, however, a pre-
sumption that he has authority to compromise 
his client's action which he is prosecuting. . . . 
Defendant Burke points out that there are 
authorities in California and Nevada which hold 
that on collateral attack the presumption of the 
attorney's authority is conclusive . . . and it has 
been held that an attorney has authority to dis-
miss an action with prejudice, the modern name 
for retraxit . . . contrary to the rule at common 
law. . . . While the above cited cases may appear 
to conflict with the rule that ordinarily an attor-
ney has no authority to surrender his client's 
rights (see quotation, supra, from 6 Cal. Jur. 
2d, Attorneys at Law, § § 156, 164), they may 
be reconciled on the theory that there is a rebut-
table presumption that he had such authority." 
The court went much further in the Gagnon Com-
pany case than the trial court did in the case now before 
8 
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the Supreme Court. The California court was concerned 
with an attorney's authority to dismiss an action with 
prejudice but along the road to its final conclusion the 
court made it clear that an attorney has the authority 
to dismiss a suit without prejudice. Counsel for re-
spondent believe that the above cited case is well rea-
soned and justifies fully the contention that the appel-
lant's attorneys had authority to stipulate and agree 
to a dismissal without prejudice. 
Respondent is not unmindful of Section 78-51-32, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, which provides: 
"An attorney and counselor has authority: 
. . . (2) To bind his client in any of the steps of 
an action or proceeding by his agreement filed 
with the clerk or entered upon the minutes of 
the court, and not otherwise." 
Although this section deals with an attorney's 
authority to bind his client under certain circumstances, 
it does not exclude other powers or authority necessarily 
involved in the attorney-client relationship. State v. 
Froah, 220 Iowa 840, 263 N.W. 525. I t is respondent's 
position that this section is inapposite to the case at 
bar, because the agreement was made in open court 
before the District Judge with jurisdiction to hear and 
dispose of the issues before him and the appellant's 
attorney had authority to move for or agree to a dis-
missal without prejudice. 
There has been one Utah case where the Utah 
Supreme Court considered this section. In McWhirter 
9 
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v. Donaldson, 36 U. 293, 104 P . 731, defendant claimed 
an oral stipulation had been entered into between coun-
sel for the respective parties extending the time for 
answering the complaint. The court held that since the 
stipulation was neither filed with the clerk nor other-
wise made a matter of record, the defendant could not 
rely upon the stipulation. However, in the McWhirter 
case, the stipulation was not entered into in open court 
but was between the counsel outside the court. Certainly 
it appears to counsel for respondent that had an exten-
sion been requested in court in the presence of both 
counsel and an agreement effectuated a different result 
would have been reached. I t is to be remembered that 
in the present matter, counsel for both parties agreed 
to a dismissal before the Judge in court. Although the 
trial Judge did not enter this agreement upon the 
minutes of the court at that time, the Judge recalled 
the agreement and dismissed the petition upon the basis 
of counsel's representations. (R. 140). While the Utah 
Supreme Court has not discussed the purpose of this 
section, it did quote a California case, Borkheim v. 
N. B. & M. Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 623, which stated that with-
out such a rule "the court would be frequently annoyed 
by disputes between counsel concerning their agree-
ments, and thus forced to try innumerable side issues 
more perplexing than the case itself, attended, also, 
with delays to its business, and the detriment to the 
public service." The trial judge in this matter did not 
have to worry about what the parties through their at-
torneys stipulated about because he was present when 
10 
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the agreement was made. When the reason for a rule 
fails, the rule fails. 
For a discussion of the purpose of this statute, a 
look to another state would be appropriate. An identical 
provision appears in the Montana statutes, Section 93-
2101(1), Repl. Vol. 7, Revised Codes of Montana, 
1947. The Supreme Court of Montana in Bush v. Baker, 
46 M. 535, 129 P . 550, 553, stated that "the purpose of 
such a rule is to promote orderly procedure and protect 
the rights of litigants, and may not be invoked to per-
petrate a wrong. The rule in question here was enacted 
to relieve the presiding judge of the necessity of deter-
mining controversies between counsel as to their un-
executed agreements, often more perplexing than the 
case itself." 
Since the Montana Court takes the same view as 
the California Court as to the purpose of this statute, 
respondent contends the statute should not be extended 
to include in-court agreements because the trial judge 
did not have to determine a controversy between counsel 
where he was present when the agreement was made. 
The agreement involved in this matter was not filed 
with the clerk nor was it entered upon the minutes of 
the court. However, in the case of Rackham v. Rackham, 
23 P . 2d 566, the Utah Supreme Court recognized an 
oral stipulation entered into in open court. Of course, 
the party, who later objected to the stipulation, was 
present at the time the stipulation was made and the 
court inferred she acquiesced in the action by her coun-
11 
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sel. Certainly, it should be inferred that the appellant 
in this case acquiesced in her counsel's representations. 
From the time the petition was filed on December 21, 
1961, until April 17, 1962, there was great activity on 
the part of both parties. From April 17, 1962, when the 
court ordered that the matter be taken under advise-
ment (R. 68) until April 16, 1963, when petitioner's 
attorneys withdrew (R. 72), appellant took no action 
to proceed. I t would seem when she signed the trust 
agreement on May 8, 1962, that she ratified and acqui-
esced in her attorneys' oral agreement. 
As pointed out in Bush v. Baker, supra, this statute 
was enacted to relieve the presiding judge of the neces-
sity of determining controversies between counsel as 
to their unexecuted agreements. The Judge could not 
possibly remember all agreements entered into in open 
court. Therefore, the theory of entering such agreements 
on the minutes of the court is a sound one. However, 
the respondent should not be denied a dismissal, where 
counsel agreed in open court to dismiss the petition if 
a trust agreement was consummated (R. 139-140), 
merely because the court inadvertently failed to have 
such agreement entered on the minutes, especially in 
view of the fact that the court remembered clearly what 
counsel represented. 
B. Assuming the court erred in dismissing the 
petition on the basis that an oral argument for dismissal 
had been entered into in open court, the court did not 
err in finding that the trust agreement was a valid 
12 
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substitute for a guardianship procedure insofar as the 
assets and person of the ward are concerned and dis-
missing on that ground. 
The appellant in her petition for appointment of 
a guardian (R. 5-6) prayed that the Walker Bank 
and Trust Company be appointed guardian of the 
person and estate of Joan Oelerich. Appellant's peti-
tion was primarily concerned with protecting the money 
that respondent was to receive from her father's estate. 
The trust agreement provided that the money received 
by respondent from her father's estate would be placed 
in a trust with the First National Bank of Chicago. 
The bank as trustee is responsible for the safe keeping 
of the money and for applying a portion of the annual 
net income of the trust to the health, support, mainten-* 
ance, and education of the respondent. If Walker Bank 
and Trust Company were appointed the general guard-
ian of Joan Oelerich, what duties would it perform? 
Respondent contends that the First National Bank 
of Chicago now performs under the trust, the very 
functions and duties contemplated to be performed by 
the Walker Bank under our guardianship statutes. 
What more could Walker Bank do that the trustee 
bank in Chicago is not doing or authorized to do ? Appel-
lant through the trust already has what she seeks 
through the petition which should render the issues 
raised by these proceedings moot. 
If respondent accepts appellant's argument that 
the motion may be regarded as one for summary judg-
13 
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ment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P., it is clear that appellant 
had ample opportunity to submit affidavits or to make 
any other appropriate showing essential to justify 
petitioner's opposition to the motion. The motion to 
dismiss was filed on June 28, 1963, (R. 74-75), and it 
was not to be heard until July 25, 1963. As a matter of 
fact, it was heard on July 29, 1963 (R. 91), a month 
after appellant's counsel had notice of such motion. 
A copy of the trust agreement (R. 76-83) was 
before the court prior to the time the court dismissed 
the petition. The fact that the trust agreement was 
effective at the time of the hearing on July 29, 1963, 
was acknowledged by appellant's counsel. (R. 140). 
A reading of the trust agreement clearly demonstrates 
that the property received by the respondent from her 
father's estate is protected from artful and designing 
persons. That the petition for appointment of guardian 
was primarily concerned with the protection of the 
property the respondent was to receive from her father's 
estate is evident from the wording of paragraph 2 of 
the trust. (R. 5). I t provides that, "The Grantors 
hereby irrevocably sell, transfer, assign and deliver to 
the Trustee the property described in the attached 
schedule. That property,. . . shall be held, administered 
and disposed of in trust upon the terms and conditions 
hereinafter set forth." Article I gives the Trustee 
power to accumulate the annual net income of the trust 
and add it to the principal at the end of each year. 
However, the Trustee may pay or apply for the benefit 
of the respondent such portion of the annual net income 
14 
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in such manner and for such purposes as shall be 
necessary or advisable for the health, support, mainten-
ance or education of respondent or any of her children. 
(R. 76). Thus, it can be seen that for at least ten years 
(R. 77) the Trustee has complete control of the prop-
erty, which the respondent received from her father's 
estate. (R. 83). 
The appellant at page 17 of her brief argues that 
the court should have taken evidence to determine what 
effect different fact situtaions would have on the ques-
tion of whether the respondent could convey her interest 
in the trust. Article IV (R. 81) should put to rest the 
question of whether or not the respondent can convey 
her interest. Under this provision, "no beneficiary of 
this trust shall have the right to alienate, encumber, 
hypothecate or anticipate any interest in the capital or 
income of the trust estate in any manner." 
Petitioner on page 16 of her brief states that there 
is nothing in the record to indicate that respondent does 
not own other assets or that she will not acquire other 
assets. The record shows (R. 66-67) that counsel for 
respondent petitioned the court for temporary support 
on April 17, 1962, because respondent and her daughter 
were "financially destitute" and were "required to ac-
cept the bounty of friends for the bare necessities of 
life." Unless this allegation was false—a charge no one 
makes—this statement would support an inference that 
respondent had no other assets at that time. Again, is 
it fair to assume that appellant would make a gift to 
15 
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the respondent, when she asserts respondent is subject 
to being deceived or imposed upon by artful or design-
ing persons? (R. 5). Should appellant be so motivated 
the trust funds could be increased and such gifts would 
be protected by the Trustee, the First National Bank 
of Chicago. 
The trial judge's ruling was not adverse to the 
holdings of this court in Kidman v. White, 14 U. 2d 
142, 378 P . 2d 898, or in Samms v. Eccles, 11 U. 2d 
289^ 358 P . 2d 344. In the Kidman case, the court was 
concerned with interpreting the provision in a contract. 
The provision was ambiguous and the Supreme Court 
declared that any doubts concerning the language 
should be resolved by a court and jury rather than by 
summary judgment. However, that holding is of no 
moment in this case for here the language of the trust 
is clear and unambiguous. Appellant has not pointed 
to one provision which is doubtful, or which would indi-
cate that respondent's property received from her 
father's estate is not protected from artful or designing 
persons. The Samms case, as this court is well aware, 
involved an action by the plaintiff for severe emotional 
distress. This court was concerned with whether or not 
the plaintiff could establish a right to recovery and 
declared that a motion for summary judgment was not 
appropriate, assuming the contentions of the plaintiff 
to be true. The matter before the trial court here in-
volved the dismissal of a petition for the appointment 
of a guardian. The appellant was not seeking to recover 
damages, as in the Samms case. The thrust of the peti-
16 
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tion was directed towards protecting the property of 
respondent, derived from her father's estate. If we 
assume this motion to be for a summary judgment, 
the trial court by dismissing, in effect found there was 
no need for appointment of a guardian of the property, 
because the trust agreement prevented the respondent 
from managing or taking care of the said property and 
protected said property from artful or designing per-
sons. 
Going one step further and assuming the trusi 
instrument adequately safeguarded the property during 
the term ofthe trust, it did not fail to supply the needs 
of a guardian for the person of the respondent. 
Provision for the appointment of guardians or com-
mittees for insane and other incompetent persons is 
quite generally made by statutes which, although pos-
sessing some similarity, vary in the different states. The 
protection of property is one of the main objects of such 
statutes, although they not infrequently authorize 
guardianship both of the person and of the estate. 25 
Am J ur 17 
Section 75-13-29, U.C.A. 1953, states, "Every 
general guardian has the care and custody of the person 
of his ward, and the management of all his estate until 
such guardianship is legally terminated." Section 75-
13-31, U.C.A. 1953, describes the duties of guardians 
of a person, "A guardian of the person shall be charged 
with the custody of the ward, and must look to his 
support, health and education." Section 75-13-32, 
17 
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U.C.A. 1953, holds that, "A guardian of the property 
must keep safely the property of his ward." Of course, 
the Utah statutes contemplate guardians of the person 
and guardians of the property. However, as pointed out 
above, one of the main objects of such statutes is the 
protection of property belonging to an incompetent. 
As argued above, the trust agreement meets the 
requirement of our law with respect to the duties of 
guardains of property. The trustee keeps safely the 
known property of respondent, the alleged incompetent. 
(R. 76-82). Under this trust agreement, there would 
be no need to have a guardian of property. And if there 
was such a guardian, what property would he protect? 
None but the property protected by the present trustee. 
With respect to the guardian of a person, it is 
respondent's position that the trial court ruled proper-
ly, because the trustee under the provisions of the trust 
agreement also performs the duties of a guardian of a 
person as specified in Section 75-13-31. The petition 
contains no allegation that the respondent is physically 
incapacitated and if that is a future contingency the 
First National Bank of Chicago may pay to or apply 
for the benefit of respondent such portion of the annual 
net income of the trust in such manner and for such 
purposes as shall be necessary or advisable for the 
health, support, maintenance or education of respond, 
ent. In effect, the trustee also has custody of the re-
spondent. Custody is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 
as, "The care and keeping of anything." By the terms 
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of the trust, the trustee is responsible for paying a por-
tion of the trust's annual income to take care of re-
spondent with respect to her health, support, and main-
tenance. 
If the petition were granted and letters of guard-
ianship were issued to Walker Bank & Trust Company 
and if there was any property for the bank to keep 
safely, it would be the same as that kept by the Chicago 
bank which would result in duplicate charges for the 
same services. And if the Walker Bank had no property 
to administer it would not and could not perform the 
duties outlined in Section 75-13-31. All of the sections 
from 75-13-33 to 75-13-44, which follow the sections 
on duties of guardians of persons and of estates, con-
template that a guardian will have property of the ward 
to administer. Certainly no bank and trust company 
is equipped to furnish nursing or custodial service for 
incompetents as its functions are financial. 
For the foregoing reasons the trial court did not 
err when it decided to dismiss the petition on the ground 
that the trust agreement protected the respondent's 
property, derived from her father's estate, ami conse-
quently, there was no need for a guardian for the person 
or the property. 
C. Assuming that Section 78-51-32(2), IT.C.A. 
1953 should be complied with in order for an agreement 
of dismissal between counsel to be binding, the petitioner 
should be equitably estopped, from, relying on said 
statute. 
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As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Cor-
poration, 4 U. 2d 155,159, 289 P . 2d 1045, quoting J . T. 
Fargason Co. v. Furst, 8 Cir., 287 F . 306, 310: 
"Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the no-
tion that, when one person makes representations 
to another which warrant the latter in acting in a 
given way, the one making such representations 
will not be permitted to change his position when 
such change would bring about inequitable con-
sequences to the other person, who relied on the 
representations and acted thereon in good faith. 
* * * The representations must be in themselves 
sufficient to warrant the action taken, and their 
sufficiency is a judicial question. I t is not enough 
that the person who heard them deemed that he 
was warranted in acting as he did; the language 
used ought of itself to furnish the warrant. One 
man might consider himself warranted in acting 
upon representations wholly insufficient to move 
a more careful and prudent person." 
Counsel for petitioner-appellant in open court repre-
sented that if respondent would sign a trust agreement, 
the petition would be dismissed. (R. 139-140). Re-
spondent relying on the representations executed the 
trust agreement on May 8, 1962. Certainly, respondent 
could only assume, as the trial judge did (R. 140), that 
petitioner's counsel were authorized to make such state-
ments. Appellant should be estopped from asserting 
the technicality that the agreement was not entered on 
the minutes of the court, especially in view of the fact 
that respondent relied on the representations made by 
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appellant's counsel in open court and that respondent 
by signing the trust agreement relinquished possession 
and control of her share of her father's estate, which 
was estimated to be in excess of $250,000 00 (R„ 5). 
In considering an identical provision (to Section 
78-51-32(2)) of the Code of Civil Procedure <if Cali-
fornia, in Reclamation District of Sacramento Co. \ 
Hamilton, 112 Cal. 603, 44 Pac. 1074, the Supreme 
Court of that state said: 
"If, under the terms of a mutual stipulation 
which was only verbal, one party has received 
the advantage for which he entered into it, or the 
other party has at his instance given up some 
right or lost some advantage, so that it would 
be inequitable for him to insist that the stipula-
tion was invalid, he will not be permitted to re-
pudiate the obligation of his own agreement 
upon the ground that it had not been entered in 
the minutes of the court." 
The reasoning of the California case is applicable 
to this matter now before the court. I t would be in-
equitable to allow the appellant to assert the statute 
and to insist that the stipulation was invalid because 
of a technicality where the respondent has signed a trust 
agreement in reliance on appellant's attorney's state-
ments in open court, which prevents IUT i'vum having 
control of her inheritance for at least ten years and **;; 
the other hand merely results in requiring the appellant 
to institute another action if she concludes there is merit 
in her claim. 
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P O I N T I I 
T H E COURT D I D NOT E R R I N D I S M I S S -
I N G T H E P E T I T I O N ON T H E G R O U N D OF 
F A I L U R E TO P R O S E C U T E W I T H D I L I -
G E N C E . 
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., provides that a defendant 
may move for dismissal of an action for failure of the 
plaintiff to prosecute. The Utah rule is similar to Fede-
ral Rule 41 (b). Rule 41 (b) clearly places dismissal for 
failure to prosecute in the court's discretion. 5 Moore's 
Federal Practice, p. 1036. Since the order of dismissal 
for failure to prosecute is discretionary, it will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless there has been abuse of dis-
cretion. 5 Moore's Federal Practice 1039. Accordingly, 
the question to be determined is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in dismissing the petition for failure 
of the plaintiff to prosecute. 
What constitutes "failure to prosecute", of course, 
depends on the facts of the particular case, 5 Moore's 
Federal Practice 1037. Neel v. Barbara, 136 F . 2d 269. 
In the present case, the petition for appointment of a 
guardian was filed on December 21, 1961. (R. 5, 6). 
From that time until April 17, 1962, appellant's coun-
sel were engaged in the prosecution of this petition, 
as shown by the record. For instance, on January 28, 
1962, petitioner's counsel filed a notice to take the 
depositions of three doctors. (R. 13). Again on Feb-
ruary 9, 1962, they filed a notice setting aside trial date 
and setting the matter for pretrial. (R. 21). On March 
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6, 1962, counsel for petitioner filed a notice to take the 
deposition of respondent (R. 25), ;u-d <>.• Man-h ;, 
1962, a motion for order to compel her =.» Mihnul ..» 
mental examination was filed (R. 26) . Fur ther , answers 
to request for admissions signed by appellant under 
Rule 36 were filed on March 12, 1962. Petitioner filed 
an affidavit with the court on March 16, 1962. On 
Apri l 17, 1962, counsel for appellant appeared at a 
hearing concerning a number of motions. ;•. ^ 
F rom that date i iiitil J : J \ !-<• !!H,:>. -;•••* \|«-il;i; -. • 
Baker, as new counsel for appellant, filed a m<>ii<»n I'm-
order to compel respondent to submit to mental exami-
nation, there had been no prosecution of the action. I t 
must be noted that the motion for dismissal on the 
ground that petitioner had not been diligent in proceed-
ing with the action was filed J u n e 28, 1963, over a year 
and two months after the petitioner had last proceeded 
and before appellant took any ad inn n* n\nw ahead. 
On the basis of the above facts, it is difficult to see how 
the trial judge abused his discretion. I n Salmon v. City 
of Stuart , Florida, 194 F . 2d 1004, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court was author-
ized in dismissing an action under Rule 41 (b ) , Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, where following the filing 
of the suit, no action was taken in it bj the plaintiffs 
for one year and three months. Where a petition for 
the appointment of a guardian has been filed and when 
such petition alleges that "Joan Oelerich . by reason 
of her mental condition, . . . is unable, unassisted, to 
properly manage and take care of her property, and 
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is likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or 
designing persons" (R. 5), it would seem incumbent 
upon the petitioner that she prosecute the action with 
diligence. By waiting over a year, the petitioner left 
the respondent in a precarious position if she is incom-
petent as alleged. How could the court abuse its dis-
cretion under such facts as these? The proper answer 
is it did not. 
Respondent is not unmindful of the Utah cases 
cited in appellant's brief and the rationale of those cases. 
In Wright v. Howe, et al., 46 U. 588, 150 P . 956, the 
court was confronted with the ruling of a trial court in 
denying defendants' motion to dismiss "for the reason 
that the plaintiff herein has failed and neglected to 
prosecute said action with reasonable diligence." The 
court said at page 589, "The defendants had the same 
right to press to trial that the plaintiff had, and if they 
were willing to permit it to remain untried, and espe-
cially in the absence of any showing of prejudice, they 
cannot complain." In the present matter, the respondent 
may have had the right to press to trial but she was 
unaware of it and in fact understood the petition would 
be dismissed when she executed the trust agreement. If 
the petitioner argues she was not bound by the state-
ment of her counsel in open court, then appellant was 
obligated to proceed with the action. The reasoning 
of the Wright case is not applicable to the facts of this 
case. On application for rehearing the Supreme Court 
made the following observation at pages 595 and 596: 
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"It is contended that we erred in not reversing 
the judgment, for the reason that the trial court 
erred in not sustaining appellants' motion to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute the 
action, and that we failed to pass or at least 
failed to sufficiently state our reasons in passing, 
upon that assignment in the original opinion. 
There is not the slightest merit to the contention. 
The case had been at issue about three years. In 
this state, if an action be determined otherwise 
than upon the merits, the plaintiff may, within one 
year thereafter, bring another of the same cause 
of action regardless of the statute of limitations, 
provided only that the original action was timely 
begun. A defendant moving to dismiss, although 
his motion be sustained, can gain no permanent 
advantage, since the plaintiff has the right at 
any time within a year to bring another action. 
In view of that fact, the whole matter of whether 
a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution 
should be sustained or not should be permitted 
to rest within the sound discretion of the trial 
courts. If those courts, therefore, refuse to dis-
miss the action on that ground, we should not 
interfere unless and until it is clearly made to 
appear that the defendant in the action has been 
prejudiced in some substantial right." 
In the Wright case, the court sustained the trial court's 
refusal to dismiss and noted that the Supreme Court 
would not interfere until it appeared "that the defend-
ant in the action has been prejudiced in some substantial 
right." Following this rationale, this court should not 
interfere with the trial court's decision in dismissing 
this case. The petitioner has not been prejudiced in 
some substantial right, ^lie <\*m nlwav--.- Hie another 
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petition for the appointment of a guardian, if she has 
reasonable grounds to believe the respondent is incom-
petent. 
In the Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 
8 U. 2d 389, 335 P . 2d 624 case, the court held that it 
was an abuse of discretion to dismiss with prejudice 
for failure to prosecute where either party had an op-
portunity to obtain the relief to which it was entitled. 
Such a holding would not be applicable to this case, 
because respondent had no opportunity to proceed, 
since she assumed the opposing attorneys had authority 
to act for appellant and understood the signing of the 
trust agreement would result in dismissal of the peti-
tion. (R. 139-140). In the Crystal Lime case the court 
at page 392 noted respondent's argument that Rule 
41(b) applies to plaintiffs and not defendants who fail 
to prosecute and that this rule was enacted for the 
benefit of defendants to save them annoyance and 
harassment by plaintiffs who file suits but fail to prose-
cute them with diligence. The court stated, "Respond-
ents' contention might be very persuasive if they had 
not filed counter claims in the action. . . . " In the 
present matter before the court a petition was filed for 
appointment of a guardian, and that was the basis of 
the action before the court. From the above language, 
it would seem that this court ought to accept the argu-
ment presented by respondent in the Crystal Lime 
case when applied to the facts of the present matter. 
For a period of one year and two months, appellant 
took no action to proceed with the petition. Respondent 
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therefore contends that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing this case. 
The Crystal Lime case involved a quiet title action. 
The Wright case was concerned with a claim for dam 
ages resulting from negligence of the defendant, which 
caused the death of four horses and injured a fifth 
horse. This case presently before the court involves a 
petition for appointment of a guardian. The compe-
tency of the respondent is in question. Certainly, it is 
incumbent for the petitioner to proceed with the case, 
especially in view of the fact that she believes respond-
ent to be incapable of taking care nf H iscf and her 
property. Respondent and the court understood that 
the petition would be dismissed when a trust agreement 
was executed. Respondent signed the agreement and 
there was no need to move the case ahead, since she 
believed the petition would be dismissed. (R. 140-141). 
However, if appellant had no understanding concern-
ing dismissal of the petition, she was not diligent in 
proceeding with the action and the court acted properly 
in dismissing for lack of prosecution. 
P E T I T I O N E R WAS NOT E N T I T L E D TO 
AN A D J U D I C A T I O N OF T H E I S S U E S TN 
H E R P E T I T I O N ON I T S M E R I T S . 
The issue of respondent's competency was not 
before the court at the hearing on Jiily 29, 1968. That 
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hearing was held for the purpose of determining 
whether or not the petition should be dismissed on the 
grounds that appellant had not been diligent in pro-
ceeding with the action and that a trust agreement had 
been signed by petitioner, respondent, and the First 
National Bank of Chicago. If the appellant was not 
diligent in proceeding with the action, the court had 
the power under Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., to dismiss the 
action without a hearing on the merits. If the attorneys 
for petitioner represented in open court that the case 
would be dismissed when the trust agreement was 
signed, the court had a right to dismiss the case in ac-
cordance with such representations, because the peti-
tioner was bound by the agreement and the court so 
held. (R. 140). Such action by the court does not con-
stitute a denial of due process of law for when the court 
dismissed on the basis of the executed trust agreement, 
it was merely carrying out what petitioner, through 
her counsel, had agreed to do. Following Rule 41(b) 
certainly could not be a denial of due process. 
Petitioner's counsel had adequate notice of the 
hearing for dismissal—from June 28, 1963, until the 
hearing on July 29, 1963. There was certainly time to 
file affidavits or prepare evidence for the hearing within 
that period. At least as early as July 29,1963, appellant 
was aware of the reasons the Judge was advancing 
for dismissal and if she claims no agreement existed 
concerning dismissal of the petition, from July 29, 
1963, until August 26, 1963, when the hearing on the 
motion to vacate was heard, petitioner had sufficient 
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opportunity to gather evidence for presentation to the 
effect of the trust agreement on the relief demanded 
by petitioner and yet she did not come forward with 
any evidence to support her position. Most certainly 
petitioner cannot now complain about lack of due pro-
cess, when she had ample opportunity to produce evi-
dence in opposition to respondent's motion and neither 
offered to nor introduced any. 
SUMMARY A N D CONCLUSION 
Trial court predicated its order for dismissal on 
the theory that petitioner, through her counsel, agreed 
to dismiss the petition if the trust agreement was signed. 
Such trust agreement was signed by petitioner, re-
spondent, and a Chicago bank. Judge Hanson merely 
ordered what petitioner had agreed to do through her 
counsel in open court. 
Appellant is estopped from relying on Section 
78-51-32(2), U.C.A. 1953, and from contending that 
the stipulation for dismissal is not binding. 
The trust agreement was acceptable to appellant 
as she operated under it for a period of 14 months. I t 
safeguards respondent's property received from her 
father's estate, as required by a guardian of property 
in Utah. The trustee by the terms of the trust must 
look to respondent's support, health and education, as 
required by the guardian of a person under Utah law. 
The appellant by means of the trust has secured what 
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she prayed for in the petition and therefore the trial 
judge did not err in dismissing the petition. 
Assuming the petitioner was not found by the 
agreement for dismissal, then she was guilty of laches 
in not proceeding with the action. To wait over a year 
before taking any action with respect to this incompe-
tency matter is unreasonable and should not be allowed, 
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
invoked Rule 41(b). 
If the petitioner is bound by the agreement for 
dismissal, there was no need for a hearing on the merits. 
Petitioner cannot complain about the denial of oppor-
tunity to be heard on the merits of the effect of the 
trust agreement, when counsel had one month's notice 
before the first hearing and another month's notice 
before the hearing to set aside the order issued as a 
result of the first hearing. 
The order of dismissal should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, this 6th day of April, 
1964. 
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS & LATIMER 
George W. Latimer 
James B. Lee 
1003 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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